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This paper shows that terrorism reduces bilateral trade flows, in real terms, by raising trading 
costs and hardening borders. Countries sharing a common land border and suffering from 
terrorism trade much less than neighboring or distant countries that are free of terrorism. The 
impact of terrorism on bilateral trade declines as distance between trading partners increases. 
This result suggests that terrorism redirects some trade from close to more distant countries. Our 
findings are robust in the presence of a variety of other calamities such as natural disasters or 
financial crises.  
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND BORDERS 
 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as furthering one’s views through acts of 
coercive intimidation. It is self evident that terrorists want to disrupt the economic and political 
process of a nation. Acts of terrorism are costly in that they require governments to incur 
immediately rescue, cleanup and reconstruction expenditures. In the longer term, terrorism raises 
anxiety and uncertainty in the community; this, in turn, adds to cost and prices of goods and 
services--e.g., the terrorist premium on crude oil prices--and reduces the propensity to invest in 
projects. Finally, terrorism prompts governments to set-up costly policies of counterterrorism. 
  There is some evidence that political instability depresses economic activities: for 
example, Alesina et al. (1996) find that economic growth slows down when government 
collapses and Barro (1991) uncovers a negative correlation between economic growth and 
political instability. As to the impact of terrorism on economic growth, the evidence appears 
more tenuous than the effect of political instability. To be sure, terrorism has had material 
economic consequences on specific areas of the world like the Basque country (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003) and Israel (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004) and on specific industries like tourism 
(Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992), but these findings cannot be extended with equal force to 
panel studies involving a large sample of countries. Bloomberg et al. (2004), using data from 
1968 to 2000 and 177 countries, detect a negative effect of terrorism on economic growth but 
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conflicts. To similar conclusions arrives Tavares (2004) who finds that the adverse impact of 
terrorist attacks washes away when additional control variables are taken into consideration. In 
contrast, natural disasters, banking and currency crises leave a persistent mark on growth. 
  There is a sizable literature in political science on the relationship between conflict and 
international trade; see Reuveny (1999-2000) for a review. In some studies--such as those by 
Pollins (1989a, 1989b) and Bergeijk (1994)--conflict is an exogenous force that raises the cost of 
doing business and lowers the amount of trade flows. In other studies, such as Polachek’s (1980), 
conflict is instead endogenous so that a nation chooses an optimal level of conflict in 
international political environments. As trade becomes more intense, the economic cost of 
conflict rises and the equilibrium level of conflict falls. Reuveny and Kang (1998) tackle the 
direction of causality between international trade and conflict and find a mixed pattern: conflict 
Granger causes trade in metals, petroleum, basic manufactured goods, and high technologies, but 
trade Granger causes conflict in food, beverages, and miscellaneous manufactured goods. 
  The interaction between international terrorism and international trade has received little 
attention in the literature so far. In Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), terrorism is exogenous and 
produces a downward shift in the intercept of a gravity equation applied to bilateral trade flows. 
The headline result in that paper is that a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents in a year 
decreases bilateral trade by about 4% in the same year. Li and Schaub (2004), on the other hand, 
ask the question whether terrorism responds to a rise in globalization and conclude that terrorist 
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  This paper starts with the premise that international terrorism is, to a first approximation, 
exogenous to bilateral trade flows and investigates how changes in terrorism activity influences 
trade primarily through changes in trading costs. Our focus on trading costs and borders is one of 
strategy, without disputing that terrorism may have secondary effects taking place through 
changes in real income and/or cultural variables that typically enter the gravity equation.  
   The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a discussion in Section 1 on how 
terrorism impacts trading costs and the thickness of borders. We then propose an empirical 
specification of such effects based on a gravity equation of bilateral trade flows in Section 2, and 
find statistically significant and economically important terrorism-induced increases in trading 
costs and hardening of the borders. The strength of our findings suggests policy implications as 
discussed in Section 3 on how best to handle border safety with a minimum impact on trade 
flows. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4. 
 
  1. Terrorism, Trading Costs, and Borders 
  A recent report of the Economist (August 20, 2005) reminds us that terrorism is not a new  
phenomenon. “Bombs, beards and fizzing fuses” are just as much the hallmark of today’s Islamic 
inspired terrorism as of the revolutionary anarchism that swept Europe and the United States 
from 1870 to the start of World War I. In addition to numerous ordinary people, victims of the 
earlier movement included the President of France, the Empress of Austria, the King of Italy, the 
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terrorism was reduced not by effective policy measures to counter it, but rather by bigger events 
like World War I. Hoffman (1998) gives a more detailed history of terrorism emphasizing that its 
inspirations, through the centuries, have swung back and forth between religious, ethno-national 
and ideological motives. The recent revival of religious terror, according to Hoffman, stems from 
the breakdown of the post Soviet state and the failure to achieve reforms in Islamic countries in 
the wake of the Iranian revolution. Whatever the specific causes, religious terrorism is 
particularly pernicious because their foot soldiers are indoctrinated to believe that their acts of 
violence are a divine duty that free them from any moral constraints on behavior.  
  Terrorism creates anxiety and makes people become more guarded about the potential 
harm imbedded in any transaction, be it a home delivery of a package or air travel. 
Counterterrorist policies tend to exacerbate the impact of terrorism on trading costs. To detect 
potentially harmful cross-border transactions, flows of people and goods must be subject to 
costly inspection and monitoring. This translates into a reduction of total factor productivity and 
real income. While all transactions are subject to this cost, cross-border transactions receive 
special attention, based either on evidence or the assumption that lethal components are more 
likely to be imbedded in foreign goods or in foreign people than in domestic ones. This was 
certainly the reaction of the U.S. government following the destruction of the twin towers on 
September 11, 2001: the national border was completely shut down for hours and subsequently 
was made much less permeable for “terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrants, 
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reactions took place in member countries of the European Union, which created an anti-terrorist 
coordinating position; see Financial Times (August 1, 2005). 
  Direct evidence that less permeable borders slows down cross-border traffic can be 
gleaned from newspaper accounts on the impact of tighter U.S. visa requirements on migration 
flows. The Financial Times of June 2, 2004 reports that “…nearly three-quarters of [surveyed] 
companies had experienced unexpected delays or arbitrary denials of business visa, while 60% 
said that the delays had hurt their companies through increased costs or lost sales.”  
Coordination in border policies is likely to be imperfect at best, leading to differences in degrees 
of border permeability and trading costs. Furthermore, countries may use such differences to 
obtain a competitive advantage. According to a survey conducted by the Council of Graduate 
Schools, foreign applications to U.S. colleges and universities fell 32% during the last reporting 
period over the previous one; for Chinese graduate applications the drop was 76% (Financial 
Times April 29, 2004). In contrast, foreign applications have been rising in Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is reported as saying “that 
international scientific exchanges and conferences in the U.S. have become almost impossible to 
organize because of the new restrictions…This hurts us. It is not serving our interests. And so we 
really do have to work on it” (Financial Times, April 23, 2004). 
 Not surprisingly, U.S. universities have been pressing the Department of Homeland Security to 
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2. Testing for Trading Costs and Border Effects 
The gravity equation has had considerable success in explaining bilateral trade flows in terms of 
income, population, distance as a proxy of trading costs, and country characteristics; for a review 
see Fratianni (chapter 2, this volume). A stylized representation of this equation is given by (1): 
 
(1) ln(xijt) = α0 + α1ln(yiyj)t + α2ln(IiIj)t + α3ln(Dij) + α4Bij + α5Fij + εijt, 
 
where xijt = real bilateral trade between country i and country j at time t; y = real gross domestic 
product; I = per capita real GDP; Dij is distance between i and j; Bij is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one when the country pair i and j have a common land border, otherwise is zero; Fij is a 
vector of other time-invariant factors that include, among others, common language, common 
colonial ties, and common institutions; and εijt is a disturbance term. Bilateral trading costs, τij, 
are unobservable and are posited to be related to distance by the relationship τij = Dij
α
3, where α3 
is the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance. National borders create a discontinuity 
in distance and, thus, a jump in transaction and regime costs. These costs are driven by 
differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, monetary 
regimes, and tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions; like transportation, these costs show up by 
creating a wedge between the price paid by consumers in the importing country and the 
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Terrorism and counterterrorism policies raise trading costs and border thickness. To the 
extent that terrorism works like crime, we should expect its impact to be greater for close 
neighborhoods and become progressively weaker as trading partners are separated farther away. 
In essence, terrorism-related trading costs ought to decline, other factors being equal, with 
distance. Terrorism also hardens national borders and, consequently, widens the price wedge and 
creates a mixture of substitution of home transactions for cross-border transactions and “trade 
diversion”. To see these effects, assume that the world consists of Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States, and that the United States hardens its border with Mexico, but not with Canada. 
Also assume that the higher bilateral border barrier raises Mexican import price from the United 
States and vice versa. U.S. exporters would substitute the home market for the Mexican market. 
On the other hand, assuming substitutability between Canadian and U.S. goods in Mexico, U.S. 
exports to Mexico would be partly replaced by Canadian exports. Similar considerations would 
hold for Mexican exports to the United States. The harder bilateral border would generate a 
mixture of substitution of home transactions for cross-border transactions, and trade diversion 
from country pairs with harder borders to country pairs with softer borders. This is essentially 
the implication of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), whose gravity model responds not only to 
bilateral trading costs, but also to “multilateral resistance” factors that depend on all bilateral 
trading costs. In sum, a hardening of the border will reduce and redirect cross-border trade unless 
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To test for the effects of terrorism on bilateral trade flows, we treat Equation (1) as being 
subject to an omitted variable problem, namely terrorism. This variable enters the gravity 
equation as an additional intercept shift parameter so that the overall level can change and also 
as a dummy variable interacting with both distance and common-land border countries. The 
estimate of the level shift parameter will give us a measure of the reduction in bilateral trade 
flows due to terrorism holding all the factors in the model constant. The estimate of the 
interacting dummy variable with distance will give us a measure of the impact of terrorism on 
trading costs. These trading costs are expected to decline as countries are farther apart. Terrorism 
severely hits neighboring countries, which are empirically defined as those sharing a common 
land border. The estimate of the interacting dummy variable with common land border countries 
will give us an estimate of the “costs” of the hardening of the border on trade. With these 
considerations, we modify Equation (1) as follows: 
(2) ln(xijt) = α0 + α1ln(yiyj)t + α2ln(IiIj)t + α3ln(Dij) + α4Bij + α5Fij
+ α6Tijt + α7Tijtln(Dij) + α8TijtBijt + εijt, 
 
where T stands for terrorism and is measured by binary variables; see below. The expected 
values of the coefficients are as follows: α1, α2 , α4, and α7 are positive; α3, α6, and α8 are 
negative; and α5 can be either positive or negative depending on whether cultural and 
institutional variables are trade enhancing or trade contracting. We will also test whether the 
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disasters, technological disasters, and banking and currency crises. In addition, we test the 
robustness when the quality of national institutions is also controlled for. 
2.1 Data 
Table 1 reports a few descriptive statistics of bilateral trade flows and explanatory variables for 
Equation (2) using a large sample of 97,803 country-pair observations over the period 1980-
1999. The description of the data underlying the benchmark gravity Equation (1) can be found in 
the Technical Appendix at the end of the volume. When natural and technological disasters are 
added, the number of observations reduces to 96,804. Due to the limited coverage of other data 
sources, the number of observations further reduces to 62,949 and then to 23,224, respectively, 
as we add institutional quality variable and then banking and currency crises. For each data set, 
we report the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of our dependent variable, real 
trade flows. The mean real trade flow increases from 218 million dollars to 220 million dollars, 
and then to 282 million dollars. When banking and currency crises are added, the mean real trade 
flow is 724 million dollars, indicating that banking and currency crisis data are only obtained 
among rather large countries. Except for the banking and currency crisis data, the coverage and 
the characteristic of other economic data are about the same; the sample size gets reduced from 
97,803 to 62,949. Here, we discuss the measurement of terrorism, natural disasters, technological 
disasters, banking crises and currency crises. 
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For international terrorism, we have used the International Terrorism Attributes of 
Terrorist Events databank (ITERATE) from Mickolus et al. (2003); see Sandler and Enders 
(2004) for a general assessment of this database. ITERATE collects event counts, except for 
number of casualties, and has been widely used in economics and political science; see, for 
example, Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart (1987); Cauley and Im (1988); Bloomberg et al. 
(2004); Li and Schaub (2004); and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004). Our terrorism variables are 
“BothT” = 1 when both trading partner countries have experienced an act of terrorism, otherwise 
0; and “OnlyoneT” = 1 when only one of the two countries in the pair has experienced an act of 
terrorism, otherwise 0. 
  For disasters, we have employed the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) from the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster at Université Catholique de Louvain in 
Belgium. EM-DAT collects 13 types of natural disasters and three types of technological 
disasters.
1 OECD (1994) assesses that EM-DAT is the closest approximation to a global hazard 
and disaster database. Like ITERATE, EM-DAT is widely cited in disaster research and in 
economics and political science; see, for example, Skidmore and Toya (2002); Auffret (2003); 
and Tavares (2004). Like terrorism, natural disasters and technological disasters are defined as a 
binary variable, using the same scheme as terrorism.
2 The reason for a binary variable rather than 
a cardinal variable, like number of people killed in a disaster, is justified by the incentive that 
developing countries may have in exaggerating reports of calamities to secure international 
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  For the quality of institutions, we have used the political risk index compiled by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) created and maintained by Political Risk Services. The 
index measures 12 different aspects of institutional quality, ranging from government stability to 
democratic accountability.
3 The ICRG database has been used in important studies such as Hall 
and Jones’ (1999) research on the link between labor productivity and social infrastructure and 
La Porta et al. (1998) on legal protection of investors. Our measure of institutional quality for the 
country pair is the logarithm of the sum of the two countries’ scores. 
  For currency and banking crises, we have relied on the compilation by Bordo et al. 
(2001) of the original data source of IMF (1998), which has been frequently cited in research on 
financial crises; see, for example, Tavares (2004). Our measure of banking crises and currency 
crises are binary variables, using the same scheme of terrorism.
4 
2.2 Empirical Findings 
We start with a discussion of Nitsch and Schumacher (2004). In column 2 of Table 2, we report 
the authors’ original estimates of the gravity equation when terrorism is defined as the sum of 
“the (additively linked) dummy of at least one terrorist action” (p. 429). The sum of the two 
dummies is a trinary variable defined as 0 when neither country suffers from terrorism, 1 when 
one country suffers from terrorism, and 2 when both countries suffer from terrorism. We refer to 
this as “Sum Terrorism Dummy”. It should be noted that although Nitsch and Schumacher use 
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trinary variable assumes that the impact of terrorism when both countries suffer from terrorism 
would be twice as large as the effect when only one country suffers from it. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Moreover, Nitsch and Schumacher restrict their sample period to the years 1968-1979, 
apparently because they use terrorism data from Mickolus (1980), even though the electronic-
based ITERATE goes well beyond 1979. The salient result in Nitsch and Schumacher is that the 
“Sum Terrorism Dummy” has a statistically significant negative coefficient and an economic 
impact of reducing bilateral trade by almost 10% if one country is affected by terrorism and 20% 
if both countries are affected by it.
5 The “Sum Terrorism Dummy” variable is reported as being 
significant at the 1% level. We reproduced the Nitsch and Schumacher experiment for the period 
1980-1999, by using the same “Sum Terrorism Dummy” variable and found that the statistical 
significance of the trend disappears; see column 3 of the table. In fact, the variable is no longer 
significant even at the 10% level. The trinary variable remains statistically insignificant even 
with our specification of the gravity equation; see last column. The results in the last column are 
very similar to those in the literature, where common RTA and inter-regional variables are added 
in addition to the variables in Nitsch and Schumacher. In sum, the impact of the terrorism 
discovered by Nitsch and Schumacher appears to be sample specific and evident only when the 
terrorism is measured in this particular, unconventional way. We found it unproductive to pursue 
this line of inquiry further. Instead, we use two separate dummy variables for terrorism and we 
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Table 3 shows results on terrorism, distance and border based on Equation (2). In column 
2 of Table 3, terrorism enters the equation only as a level (or intercept term) shift parameter; in 
column 3 it also interacts with distance; and in column 4, it also interacts with common land 
borders. All the coefficient estimates of the six terrorist variables are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level and have the expected sign. The interaction between terrorism and 
common land borders is economically strong, stronger than the level shift parameter. Pairs of 
countries in which both partners suffer from terrorism trade 62% less than country pairs not 
subject to terrorism; pairs in which only one country suffers from terrorism trade 41% less than 
country pairs not subject to terrorism. The level effect of terrorism on all bilateral trade implies a 
reduction of 25% in bilateral trade flows when both countries experience terrorism and 32% 
when only one country experiences terrorism.
6
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Terrorism-related trading costs decline as distance between trade partners increases. For 
example, the elasticity of real bilateral trade flows with respect to distance for both countries 
experiencing terrorism is -1.035 against an elasticity of -1.08 for countries not subject to 
terrorism. The numerically smaller elasticity of terrorism-prone countries partially offsets the 
negative impact of terrorism working through the level shift parameter. The differential 
elasticities also corroborate the proposition that terrorism has differentiated location effects. The 
interaction of terrorism with common border shows that the impact of terrorism for non-
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more clearly how terrorism interacts with distance and border, we have selected three pairs of 
trading partners, which all have experienced terrorism in the same year in the sample. Israel and 
Jordan share a common land border; Pakistan and Tunisia are separated by about the average 
distance in the sample (3,527 miles), and Ecuador and Singapore have the greatest distance in 
the sample (12,320 miles). The Impact of terrorism -- measured by the level shift parameter, the 
terrorism dummy interacting with distance, and the terrorism dummy interacting with common 
border-- reduces the logarithm of real bilateral trade flows by 9.4% between neighboring Israel 
and Jordan, but only by 0.022% between Pakistan and Tunisia at the average distance; on the 
other hand, terrorism actually raises the logarithm of bilateral trade by 0.41% between the very 
distant Ecuador and Singapore. For this last pair of countries, the positive border interaction 
effects more than offsets the negative impact working through the level shift parameter; see 
Table 4. These patterns are consistent with terrorism redistributing trade flows from close to 
distant countries. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The above findings appear to be robust in the presence of other calamities, such as 
natural and technological disasters, the quality of national institutions, and banking and currency 
crises; see Table 5. Natural disasters, in contrast to terrorism, have statistically negative effects 
across all countries but positive ones for neighboring countries. Technological disasters, on the 
other hand, have a statistically positive level effect but a negative one for common border 
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kinds of disasters. Natural disasters may prompt neighbors to embark on cooperative strategies 
that enhance bilateral trade flows. Technological disasters may instead spark protectionist 
responses that reduce trade flows. The estimated coefficients of the banking and currency crises 
dummy variables are either statistically insignificant or positive. It should be noted that banking 
and currency crises are much less numerous than other calamities and the characteristics of the 
sample are different from those without them as shown in Table 1, a possible reason for the odd 
result in the estimation. Institutional quality has a strong positive intercept impact on bilateral 
trade flows but a negative one for neighboring countries; this too is counter to our expectation. In 
sum, a few unexplainable aspects notwithstanding, the salient aspect of Table 5 is that the 
addition of other calamities does not alter the statistical and economic significance of terrorism 
on bilateral trade flows. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
  We report the economic significance of terrorism on trade in Table 6. Column 1 shows 
the estimates of the coefficients, reported in column 4 of Table 3, multiplied by the (sample) 
mean value of the corresponding variables of the simple specification of the gravity equation. 
The predicted value of the log of bilateral trade without any terrorism is 12.0828. Column 2 
shows the prediction of a specification when terrorism is added to the previous column under a 
scenario that both trading partners suffer from terrorism. The predicted log bilateral trade is 
11.1125. The terrorism accounts for a reduction of 8.03% in the logarithm of bilateral trade 
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similar procedure, we compute the marginal impact of disasters (columns 3 and 4) and 
institutional quality (columns 5 and 6). Disasters, conditional on terrorism and institutional 
quality, reduce the predicted logarithm of bilateral trade by 2.87%. A one standard deviation 
decline in institutional quality, conditional on terrorism, disasters, and institutional quality, 
reduce the logarithm of bilateral trade by 0.9%. In sum, the exercise confirms the economic 
importance of terrorism against the background of disasters and quality of institutions. The 
impact of terrorism is by far larger than the impact of other disasters and crises. The trading 
partners sharing common land borders and terrorism activities have an extra burden of higher 
transaction costs which reduce their trade, in logarithmic terms, by 8%.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
3. Implications of Border Policy 
We have seen that terrorism exerts a large negative impact on trade by raising trading costs. By 
hardening borders, especially between neighboring trading partners, terrorism contributes to 
higher trading costs and to the subsequent substitution of home trade for cross-border trade. 
These effects are likely to be much higher for small and open economies than for large and 
relatively closed economies. Another adjustment resulting from the hardening of the borders 
comes from the redistribution of trade from country pairs with higher trading costs to country 
pairs with lower trading costs. Our evidence shows that terrorism redistributes and diverts trade 
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diversion are likely to be much more widespread when countries adopt different border policies, 
with soft-barrier countries gaining trade at the expense of hard-barrier countries. 
  The negative consequences of harder border policies could be partially offset by 
cooperative arrangements. Neighboring countries tend to trade more than distant countries and 
have more to lose by not cooperating. As an example, the United States has long land borders 
with both Canada and Mexico. Canada is the most important trading partner of the United States 
and Mexico is the third. Failure to cooperate on common border policies would induce 
substitution of home for cross-border transactions. Since these substitutions would be deeper in 
Mexico and Canada than in the United States, Canada and Mexico would have a greater 
incentive to follow U.S. border policy than the United States to follow either Canadian or 
Mexican border policies. Similarly, in the European Union the large member countries have 
incentives to set their own harder border policies and the small ones have incentives to follow 
those policies. 
  Cooperative arrangements on border policy may actually accelerate the process of 
regional deepening, as evidenced from our results (see Table 3). Regional trade agreements with 
homogeneous countries and preferences would be the fastest in implementing such a perimeter. 
Customs unions would face lower coordinating costs than free trade associations. In sum, 
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The main thesis of this paper is that terrorism exerts a negative impact on bilateral trade flows by 
raising trading costs and hardening borders. The evidence marshaled in this paper indicates that 
neighboring countries suffering from terrorism trade considerably less than countries not subject 
to it. As distance increases between countries, the impact of terrorism declines. That is, the 
elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance declines for terrorism-affected countries, 
suggesting that some trade is redirected from close to more distant countries as a result of 
terrorism. The positive impact working through distance tends to offset the negative impact 
working through the level shift parameter. These findings are robust in the presence of natural 
disasters, technological disasters, the quality of national institutions, banking crises, and 
currency crises.  
The economic consequences of safer borders are likely to hit hardest small and open 
economies and to increase the home bias of international trade. It will also divert cross-border 
trade towards countries with smaller border restrictions. In an attempt to minimize the cost of 
hardened borders, some regional trade agreements may experiment with common security 












1 Natural disasters include droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, famines, floods, slides, 
volcanic eruptions, waves/surges, wild fires, wind storms, epidemics, and insect infestations. 
Technological disasters include industrial, transport, and miscellaneous accidents. See http://www.em-
dat.net/  for definitions and data. 
2 BothNat and OnlyoneNat denote, respectively,  both countries  and only one country in the pair 
experiencing natural disasters. BothTech and OnlyoneTech have similar meanings for technological 
disasters. 
3 The complete list includes government stability (12% weight), socioeconomic conditions (12%), 
investment profile (12%), internal conflict (12%), external conflict (12%), corruption (6%), military in 
politics (6%), religion in politics (6%), law and order (6%), ethnic tensions (6%), democratic 
accountability (6%), and bureaucratic quality (4%). 
4 BothBank and OnlyoneBank  denote, respectively,  both countries  and only one country in the pair 
experiencing a banking crisis. BothCurr and OnlyoneCurr are the corresponding variables for currency 
crises.  
5 We ignore the authors’ estimates when terrorism is defined as log(1+ number of terrorist actions), 
which give rise to the headline result that a doubling of terrorist attacks is associated with a 4% decline in 
bilateral trade.    
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1 97,803 2,180,700 1.75E+07  0.00015 1.09E+09 
 
Log ( real Trade Flow)  97,803 10.7692  3.0379 -8.8161 20.8112 
 
Log of real GDP
1 97,803 48.8429  2.5088 38.6652 59.0900 
Log ( real 
 per capita GDP)
1 97,803 16.4559  1.5084 9.90  05 21.3783 
 
Log ( distance)
2 97,803 8.2135 0.7692 4.0168 9.4215 
 
Common Border  97,803 0.0244 0.1543  0  1 
 
Common language  97,803 0.2105 0.4077  0  1 
 
Common country  97,803 0.0003 0.0166  0  1 
 
Common colonizer  97,803 0.0821 0.2745  0  1 
 
Colonial relationship  97,803 0.0212 0.1441  0  1 
 
Common currency  97,803 0.0069 0.0827  0  1 
 
Common RTA  97,803 0.0222 0.1473  0  1 
 
Inter-regional  97,803 0.1204 0.3254  0  1 
 
Sum Terrorism  97,803 1.0174 0.7032  0  2 
 
Both Terror  97,803 0.2561 0.4365  0  1 
 
BothT* log (distance)  97,803 2.0923 3.5905  0  9.419 
 
BothT* Border  97,803 0.0090 0.0944  0  1 












Only One Terror  97,803 0.5052 0.5000  0  1 
 
OnlyoneT*log(distance)  97,803 4.1632 4.1519  0 9.4215 
 
OnlyoneT*Border  97,803 0.0091 0.0949  0  1 
 
Both Natural Disaster  96,864 0.3452 0.4754  0  1 
 
BothNat* log (distance)  96,864 2.8736 3.9826  0 9.4215 
 
BothNat* Border  96,864 0.0112 0.1051  0  1 
 
Only One Natural Disaster  96,864 0.4831 0.4997  0  1 
 
OnlyoneNat*log(distance)  96,864 3.9764 4.1447  0 9.4215 
 
OnlyoneNat*Border  96,864 0.0087 0.0929  0  1 
Both Technological Disaster  96,864 0.1730 0.3783  0  1 
 
BothTech* log (distance)  96,864 1.4365 3.1554  0 9.4215 
 
BothTech* Border  96,864 0.0057 0.0754  0  1 
 
Only One Tech. Disaster  96,864 0.4807 0.4996  0  1 
 
OnlyoneTech*log(distance)  96,864 3.9721 4.1603  0 9.4215 
 
OnlyoneTech*Border  96,864 0.0099 0.0992  0  1 
 
Real Trade Flow  96,864 2,197,638 1.76E+07  0.00015 1.09E+09 
 
Institutional Quality  62,949 4.8434 0.1847 3.6636 5.2470 
 
IQ*log(distance)  62,949 39.8351  4.0779  18.45768  48.91247 
 
IQ*Border  62,949 0.1174 0.7419  0 5.2257 
 
Real Trade Flow  62,949 2,819,222 2.08E+07  0.00015 1.09E+09 
 
Both Banking Crisis  23,224 0.0035 0.0593  0  1 
 
BothBank* log (distance)  23,224 0.0288 0.4867  0 9.3912 
 
BothBank* Border  23,224 0.0003 0.0174  0  1 












Only One Banking Crisis  23,224 0.1082 0.3106  0  1 
 
OnlyoneBank*log(distance)  23,224 0.9161 2.6411  0 9.4190 
 
OnlyoneBank*Border  23,224 0.0033 0.0571  0  1 
 
Both Currency Crisis  23,224 0.0065 0.0806  0  1 
 
BothBank* log (distance)  23,224 0.0560 0.6927  0 9.4190 
 
BothBank* Border  23,224 0.0002 0.0147  0  1 
 
Only One Currency Crisis  23,224 0.1629 0.3693  0  1 
 
OnlyoneCurr*log(distance)  23,224 1.3790 3.1404  0 9.4190 
 
OnlyoneCurr*Border  23,224 0.0050 0.0702  0  1 
 
Real Trade Flow  23,224 7,243,371 3.33E+07  0.00883 1.02E+09 
 
Notes: 
1Real trade flows are in hundreds of U.S. dollars. Real GDP and real per capita GDP are expressed in U.S. 
dollar. The base year of real trade flows, real GDP, and real per capita GDP is 1982-1984. 
2 The unit of distance is the mile. 
 
Table 2. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) 
  Nitsch & Schumacher  Our Equation 
Variable (1968-1979) (1980-1999)  (1980-1999) 
     

























































































Common currency     0.9513
***
(0.0742) 
Common RTA     0.9241
***
(0.0359) 
Inter-regional     0.1729
***
(0.0153) 
   
Time Fixed Dummies  Estimated but not reported here 
     









     
 Obs.  59,780 97,803 97,803 
R
2 0.63 0.6823 0.6850 
     
Test Statistics 
Additional variables are jointly 
0 
    F(3, 97772) = 304.60 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level is indicated by 
***, at 
the 5% by 
**, and the 10% by 
*. 
































































































































Time Fixed Dummies  Estimated but not reported here 






























BothT*Border     -0.9699
***
(0.0966) 
OnlyoneT*Border     -0.5306
***
(0.1010) 
 Obs.  97,803 97,803  97,803 
R
2 0.6851 0.6852  0.6855 
Test Statistics 
Additional variables are jointly 0 
F(2, 97770) = 8.30 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(4, 97768) = 13.65 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(6, 97766) = 27.51 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Table 4. Impact of Terrorism on Selected Pairs of Countries 
 






















       
intercept  -28.9563 -28.9563 -28.9563 -28.9563 -28.9563 
Log of real GDP  0.8394 42.3377 
 
40.4077 41.5799 40.3134 
Log of real per capita 
GDP 
0.4843 8.0828 8.3422 7.3395 8.3134 
Log of distance  -1.0770 -6.7811 -4.7383 -8.7973  -10.1443 











Common Border  0.9167 0.9167 0.9167  0  0 
Common language  0.3893 0.3893 0.3893  0  0 
Common country  0.5910 0 0 0 0 
Common colonizer  0.5819 0  0.5819 0 0 
Colonial relationship  1.3599 0 0 0 0 
Common currency  0.8688 0 0 0 0 
Common RTA  0.9455 0 0 0 0 
Inter-regional  0.1660 0 0 0  0.1660 




(1) 12.6446 16.9432 11.1658  9.6922 
       
       
Both Terrorism  -0.2870 -0.2870 -0.2870 -0.2780 -0.2870 
BothT*log( distance)  0.0349 0.2197 0.1535 0.2851 0.3287 
BothT*Border  -0.9699 -0.9699 -0.9699  0  0 
       
Terrorism effects
1 (2) -1.0372 -1.1034 -0.0019  0.0417 
       
Sum of all effects
1 (3) = (1)+(2)  109,913  7,571,052  70,536  16,881 




(4) 14.6065 11.7381  8.5260 10.2057 
Impact of terrorism as a 
percent of predicted 
values 
 
(2)/(3) -8.9% -6.1%  -0.017% 0.43% 
Impact of terrorism as a 
percent of actual values 
 
(2)/(4) -8.9% -9.4%  -0.022% 0.41% 
1Units are in hundreds of dollars. 
Table 5. Terrorism, Disasters, Institutional Quality, and Financial Crises 
 
Variable 
Terrorism, Disasters and 
Institutional Quality 
Terrorism, Disasters, Institutional 
Quality, and Financial Crises 





































      



































      














NA NA NA NA 























































   
Time Fixed Dummies  Estimated but not reported here 
      












































































         









































































Both Banking Crisis      0.3297
***
(0.2299) 
Only One Banking Crisis      0.1544
***
(0.0398) 
BothBank*Border      -0.3612
***
(0.4410) 
OnlyOneBank*Border      0.0240
***
(0.1550) 
Both Currency Crisis      0.0674
***
(0.1502) 
Only One Currency Crisis      -0.0467
***
(0.0337) 
BothCurr*Border      1.4172
***
(0.6757) 
OnlyOneCurr*Border     0.1491
***
(0.1332) 
      
 Obs.  62,233 62,233 17,829 17,829 
R
2 0.7043 0.7118 0.7964 0.8041 
Test Statistics 
Additional variables are jointly 0 
F(10, 62191) = 138.59 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
       F(8, 17781) = 3.73   
Prob > F = 0.0002 
See notes to Table 2. 
                  Table 6. Marginal Economic Significance of Terrorism, Disasters, and Institutional Quality 
 
Both countries had 
terrorism activities 
Both countries had 
natural disaster 
and tech. disaster 
Decreasing 
unit standard deviation of 
Institutional Quality 
Variable  (Table3 Column4)  (Table5 Column3)  (Table5 Column3) 
Intercept 
 




Log of real GDP 
 




Log of real  
per capita GDP 















Log of distance 
 




























Both Natural Disaster 
 










Both Tech. Disaster 
 





















Predicted value of Log of 









Marginal impact as a per 









Number of Observation  97,803 97,803 62,233 62,233 62,233 62,233 
Notes: 
Xstatistically insignificant. Effects are calculated as coefficients multiplied by mean values. For example, the 
coefficient and the mean value of log of real GDP in table 3 is 0.8394 and 48.8429, respectively. Therefore, the 
effect is 40.9987 (=0.8394 * 48.8429). Mean values are obtained from each sample. For instance, the mean value of 
log of real GDP in column 3 of table 5 is 49.4240. We do not report each sample mean value here. Decreasing 
institutional quality is defined by a reduction of one standard deviation of institutional quality. Marginal impact 
measures the difference in the predicted value of the equation estimated with the variables indicated in the column 
relative to the prediction of the equation without those variables. For example -8.03 = (11.1125/12.0828 – 1)*100. 
 
 